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Abstract 
The emergence of open source and Linux has burdened IT managers with the challenge 
of whether, when, and in what applications to adopt open source software in their firms. 
We characterize the conditions under which enterprises adopt open source software. We 
show that adoption depends crucially on network effects, the fit of software with the 
range of applications used by each firm, and the IT capabilities of a firm. Our model 
predicts that most firms will adopt a heterogeneous IT architecture that consists of open 
source and proprietary software. The equilibrium adoption is often socially inefficient. 
This is the first paper in the open source literature to model the enterprise adoption of 
open source.  
Keywords: Open source software, Linux, IT management, IT architecture, IT 
capabilities, technology adoption. 
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1. Introduction  
Linux and open-source software is an important emerging movement in the 
software industry. IDC predicts double-digit growth of Linux adoption.1  The U.S. 
President s Information Technology Advisory Committee (2000) recommended direct 
subsidies for open source projects to advance high-end computing.  
The academic literature has recently paid significant attention to the development 
of open source software (Lerner and Tirole 2004). Notably, this literature seems to ignore 
the adoption of open-source software, focusing instead on the supply-side of the software 
industry. Nevertheless, IT managers face tremendous challenges in making decisions on 
adoption of open source products (Golden 2005). Policy makers need guidelines to 
understand the social welfare implications from open source software adoption. 
Proprietary software firms and open source software distributors need to understand how 
they can optimize their marketing strategies based on the factors that shape the enterprise 
adoption of software products. The critical question is who will adopt open source 
software, and for what application? 
This is the first paper to analyze enterprise adoption of open source software, and, 
in particular, to characterize the conditions under which firms adopt open-source 
software. Therefore we contribute to the open source literature by investigating an 
important but unexplored so far theme. The paper also contributes to the technology 
adoption literature. 
Another contribution of the research is that we attempt to model real information 
technology (IT) management and IT adoption issues, looking into specific aspects of the 
IT infrastructure, an approach neglected by economics research and often by information 
systems economics research, as well. We capture important IT aspects, such as the 
heterogeneity of firms applications and capabilities, and concerns of IT managers, such 
as the optimization of their IT architecture and IT investment, into economic modeling. 
The paper helps IT managers optimize their IT investment decisions taking into account 
                                                
1 eWeek reports IDC sees double digit growth continuing for Linux, Dec. 8 2004 at 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1737068,00.asp.   
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the emergence of open source software and characterizes the IT architecture equilibrium 
of firms. 
In our model firms are heterogeneous in terms of their IT capabilities. Also every 
firm uses a range of applications, from server-based enterprise applications, to client-
based personal productivity applications. This range of applications defines the IT 
architecture of the firm. The choice of a firm is whether to use an open source or a 
proprietary software infrastructure for each application, so that it maximizes the value of 
its whole IT architecture. There are also network effects that depend on the installed base 
of each application and a misfit cost which captures the fact that a given software product 
is ideal for some applications but less fit  for other applications.   
We find that there are a number of adoption patterns that depend on the strength 
of the network effect and the misfit cost for the applications. Most often firms have a 
heterogeneous software infrastructure using both proprietary and open source software. 
The higher the IT capabilities of a firm the more it adopts open source software. Low IT 
capability firms may adopt proprietary infrastructure for all their applications, and firms 
with strong IT capabilities may adopt only open source for all their applications. These 
results are consistent with evidence from the IT press. For example, a survey of IT 
managers by Information Week shows that 60% of the firms have mixed IT architecture, 
2% exclusively open source and 38% exclusively commercial.2 The equilibrium adoption 
is not socially optimal. The market does not internalize the network externalities, as much 
as a social planner does. The equilibrium adoption of open source or proprietary software 
might be socially excessive.  
The structure of the paper is the following. First, we discuss the existing open 
source literature. Section 3 presents a first simple model of enterprise adoption of open 
source, which does not consider the whole range of applications in the enterprise, but 
analyzes in-depth differences in terms of basic functionality, network effects and 
derivative value of proprietary and open source software. Section 4 presents the main 
model of the paper and its analysis. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.   
                                                
2
 Information Week, Nov. 1st 2004, Open Source software use joins the mix , 
(http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=51201599) 
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2. Overview of Open Source Software Literature  
The economics literature on open source focuses mainly on the individual 
incentives to participate in open source projects, the incentives of firms to adopt open 
source initiatives, the business models of firms operating within the open source 
landscape, and the competitive implications of open source software (Lerner and Tirole 
2004, Rossi 2004).  Johnson (2002) models the contribution to an open-source project as 
a problem of private provision of a public good and analyzes the effect of increasing the 
number of developers.  Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2002) discuss the incentives of 
individual programmers and software firms to participate in open source projects.  They 
argue that programmers are motivated by peer recognition and delayed career benefits 
such as being hired by a software firm, or getting access to funding for future software 
ventures.  Firms participate because they make money from complementary applications 
or services, get access to development talent that they may hire in the future, learn about 
the competition and open-source technologies, and promote open standards (possibly 
competing to other proprietary standards).  Mustonen (2003) proposes a model in which 
the participation of programmers in open-source projects is endogenous and shows that a 
low implementation cost of an open-source application is crucial for its survival when it 
competes with a proprietary application. Bitzer and Schroder (2003) consider competition 
in technology, rather than prices or quantities, in a software duopoly market. Casadesus-
Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) studies a dynamic setting of competition between 
Windows and Linux. Economides and Katsamakas (2005a) analyze the strategic 
differences between a proprietary and an open-source technology platform. Economides 
and Katsamakas (2005b) study the innovation incentives of application and platform 
developers. Mustonen (2005) analyzes when a proprietary software firm may support the 
development of substitute open source software. Comino and Manenti (2004) assume 
informed and uninformed users about the existence of open-source applications, and 
study the welfare implications of public policies supporting open-source software. Von 
Hippel and von Krogh (2003) argue that open source software development combines 
elements of the private and the collective innovation models. Hann et al (2004) examine 
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empirically the benefits of individual participation in open source projects. DiBonna 
(1999), Raymond (2001) and Fink (2003) provide good overviews.  
3. A Simple Model   
Open source products differ from proprietary products in many perspectives. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the most influential factor that drives the customers 
adoption decision is low cost and "openness" of open source software. Openness provides 
customers with the ability to access the source code, easily modify the base product and 
derive further applications (Fink, 2003; Rosenberg, 2000). However, the value of 
openness, which we call derivative value, is not necessarily the same to all firms. For 
example, firms with higher IT competence are capable of deriving higher value from the 
open source product (Dedrick and West, 2004).  
In the current model, we focus on three key factors which can differ between 
proprietary and open source software. These are price, basic functionalities, and potential 
derivative values, which also differ across customers depending on their IT competence. 
In particular, there are two products in the market: one open source product (O) 
and one proprietary product (P). The marginal production costs for both are zero. 
Customers can download the open source product for free and have access to the source 
code, or purchase the proprietary product at a price  p   without access to the source 
code.3 Customers are heterogeneous in their IT competence, which is captured by    ( 
0,1 ,
  with c.d.f.  F  ). There is a continuum mass 1 of customers. Customers 
benefit both from the functions of the software by itself and from positive consumption 
externalities within the same product network, assuming incompatibility. We assume an 
additive utility function, following many other studies (Economides and Himmelberg, 
1995; Farrell and Saloner, 1986). A customer that adopts the product OPi ,  gets utility: 
                                                
3
 Since the basic model focuses on the adoption side, we will treat this price as exogenous. Making this 
price endogenous, can be part of the model extensions. 
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uP KP h nP p,or
uO KO h nO
where  h ni   is the benefit from product  i s   network externality, and  Ki   is the 
stand-alone value of product  i   for customers of type   . The stand-alone value of the 
software product comes from two sources: functions that are enabled by the software, 
called basic functionalities, and functions that can be developed from the software by 
modifying and extending the source code or using the application program interfaces 
(APIs) provided, called derivative value. The value of the basic functionalities are 
assumed to be homogenous among customers (si  ,  i O   or  P  ).4 On the other hand, 
the derivative value is an increasing function of the customer's technical competence--the 
higher IT capability the firms have, the higher derivative value they are able to gain from 
the software. Without loss of generality, we assume linear function as ai   ( ai 0  ), 
where the increasing rate  ai   is a feature of the software product depending on its 
support for further application development. Firms could incur costs for further 
development. We abstract this away, and assume ai  represents the final benefit of the 
derivative value. Hence, 
POiasK iii or  ,)(
Depending on specific setting or software application,  sO   or  aO   can be greater, 
equal or smaller than  sP   or  aP   respectively. Indeed, open source software's "openness" 
offers easy access to the source code and a cheap (even free) access to a global pool of IT 
intelligence, hence may increase its power to facilitate further development (higher aO  . 
On the other hand, the vendor of the proprietary software has total control over the 
product design, provision of APIs, marketing and coordination of the developers 
network (Economides and Katsamakas 2005a). It's possible that under certain scenarios, 
the proprietary software has higher aP . We will characterize the equilibria under these 
different scenarios, and interpret the results in real-life practical examples.  
                                                
4
 Further extensions involving the dimensions of customer heterogeneity will be discussed. 
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To simplify the formulas, we assume the benefit from network externality is 
linearly increasing with the number of adopters:  
.or  ,)( POiennh ii
In the analysis that follows, we solve a static game where all customers decide on 
which software to adopt simultaneously.5 The analysis focuses on the conditions under 
which firms adopt open-source software, and the implications for the social welfare.  
Simple Model Analysis and results 
There are six cases depending on the relative value of the model parameters. In the 
following we summarize these cases.  
Case 1  sO sP p   and  aP aO
 
The social optimal choice of technology is all customers adopt the proprietary software. 
Nevertheless, there are multiple equilibria in the customers' non-cooperative technology 
adoption game even when one product obviously dominates the other one. 
All customers adopt the proprietary software is always an equilibrium regardless 
of the magnitude of network externality. No customer has incentive to deviate 
given the superiority of the proprietary software and benefit from network 
externality. 
If the network effect is very strong compared with the superiority of the 
proprietary software ( )easaps OOPP  , there exists an equilibrium 
where all customers adopt the inferior open source product. 
If the network effect is moderate compared with the superiority of the proprietary 
software ( OOPPOP asapseaa 2/)(  ), there exists an equilibrium 
where customers with IT competency  )2/()( OPOP aaespse   adopt 
the proprietary product while the less IT competence firms adopt the open source 
product. 
                                                
5
 One could extend this setting into a dynamic setting where customers make decisions sequentially. 
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If the network effect is not large compared with the superiority of the proprietary 
software ( 2/)( OP aae  ), the only equilibrium has all the firms adopt the 
superior proprietary software product. 
In summary, the social optimal outcome occurs when all firms adopt the superior 
proprietary software product. If the incremental network benefit from one more firm 
joining a network is not too large compared with the superiority of the proprietary 
product, the social optimal outcome is the only equilibrium.   
Case 2  0 sP p sO    sP   and  aP aO
 
The socially optimal choice of technology is all customers adopt the proprietary software. 
On the other hand, the relatively high price makes the proprietary software less attractive 
to the less IT competent firms. At equilibrium, the social optimal outcome may occur if 
the network externality is in an appropriate range.  In comparison with a relatively low 
price (case 1) ( sP p sO   and  aP aO  ), there is lower probability that the socially 
optimal case will occur, since it is more likely that some or all customers adopt the low 
cost open source software because of the proprietary software s relatively high price.  
If the network externality is strong ( epss PO )(  ), there exists one 
equilibrium where all customers adopt the proprietary product. 
If network externality is strong enough ( easaps OOPP )(  ), there 
exists one equilibrium where all customers adopt the open source product. 
For the rest of the cases ( )](),(min[ OOPPPO asapspsse  ), there 
exist equilibria where some customers adopt the proprietary product ( 
)2/())(( eaaepss OPPO  ) while others adopt the open source 
product.  
Case 3  sP sO   and  aP aO
The social optimal outcome is not obvious in this case, depending on the tradeoff 
between the benefit from network externalities and the benefit from basic functionality 
and derivative value. Each of the three cases may be social optimal (all customers adopt 
the proprietary product, all customers adopt the open source product or some adopt the 
proprietary while others adopt the open source product), depending on the value of the 
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parameters. The equilibrium results are the same to the above case where  
0 sP p sO    sP   and  aP aO  , since the adjusted quality  sP p   is all that the 
customers care about. In this case, the social planner has to be careful while considering 
which choice is optimal. The critical concerns include the distribution of IT competence 
among all firms ( F  ), benefit from network effects ( h n  ) and the technology 
superiority of one product over the other ( sP , sO   and  aP ,aO  ).  
Case 4  sP sO   and  aP aO
 
The social optimal outcome is to have all customers adopt the open source product. The 
fulfilled expectation equilibria are the following: 
All customers adopt the open source software is always an equilibrium regardless 
of the magnitude of network externality. No customer has incentive to deviate 
given the superiority of the open source software and benefit from network 
externality. 
If the network effect is very strong compared with the superiority of the open 
source software ( ))( eapsas PPOO  , there exists an equilibrium where 
all customers adopt the inferior proprietary product 
If the network effect is moderate compared with the superiority of the open source 
software ( )(2/)( PPOOPO apsaseaa  ), there exists an 
equilibrium where customers with IT competency  
)2/())(( OPPO aaeepss   adopt the open source product while the 
less IT competent firms adopt the proprietary product. 
If the network effect is not large compared with the superiority of the open source 
software ( 2/)( PO aae  ), the only equilibrium has all the firms adopt the 
superior open source software product. 
This case is symmetric to case 1. The dominance of Apache in the web server market 
could be an example of this case.  
Case 5  sP p sO sP   and  aP aO
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The social optimal outcome is not obvious in this case, depending on the tradeoff 
between benefit from network externalities and benefit from better product fit. Each of 
the three cases may be social optimal (all customers adopt the proprietary product, all 
customers adopt the open source product or some adopt the proprietary while others 
adopt the open source product), depending on the value of the parameters. The 
equilibrium results are the same to the above case where  sP sO   and  aP aO  , since 
the adjusted quality  sP p   is all that the customers care about. Realize that although it's 
likely to see all customers adopt the open source software, especially when network 
effects are not very strong, this may not be a social optimal outcome. Less IT competent 
firms may benefit more from a lower-priced proprietary product, given its high quality in 
basic functionalities.  
Case 6  sO sP p   and  aP aO
 
The social optimal outcome is not obvious in this case, depending on the tradeoff 
between benefit from network effect and that from better product fit, and the value of the 
parameters. Each of the three cases may be social optimal (all customers adopt the 
proprietary product, all customers adopt the open source product or some adopt the 
proprietary while others adopt the open source product). The less IT competent firms may 
benefit more from a lower-priced proprietary product, given its high quality in basic 
functionalities.  
4. Main Model  
In this model, the proprietary software vendor can influence the market 
equilibrium by setting price p for its product.  In addition, firms  adoption decision 
involves a range of applications.  
Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their IT capabilities, which are indexed 
by .  is assumed to be uniformly distributed in [0, 1].  A larger  means better IT 
capabilities and the firm gets more value out of its IT applications.  There is a continuum 
of firms of mass 1.   
Each firm uses a range of applications, from core enterprise applications (server-
side), to desktop personal productivity applications. There is a continuum of applications 
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uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. The proprietary software (W) and the open source 
software (L) are differentiated based on which application each software fits the most.  
Without loss of generality, we assume the proprietary software is located at 0, and the 
open source software is located at 1.  If a firm adopts W or L for an application that does 
not locate at 0 or 1, then it incurs a product misfit cost of c per unit distance .  The 
whole range of applications used by each firm defines its IT architecture.  Each firm 
adopts L or W for each one of its applications, in order to maximize the total value that 
the firm gets from the whole range of applications it uses6.  The model allows firms to 
use L for some applications and W for other applications, if that is the IT architecture 
they find optimal.  
The better the IT capabilities of a firm the more value it can get out of adopting 
open source. A firm with strong IT capabilities can take advantage of the openness of the 
code to customize their infrastructure, and are able to manage and support effectively the 
deployment of open source architecture. Firms with weak IT capabilities may find it 
difficult to get significant value out of open source, or they risk a failure, because there is 
no vendor to provide them with ready solutions and comprehensive support. We assume 
that the firms  IT capabilities do not affect the value the firm gets from adopting W. 
The cost structure of adopting L versus W is different. W requires a substantial 
fixed cost LC  to customize it and make sure it works for your company, but the cost of 
using it in more applications is almost zero (e.g. Google scaled its Linux infrastructure on 
thousands of servers without having to pay a licensing fee for each server). The cost of 
using W is mostly variable and depends on how many applications you use, and the 
licensing fee p  set by firm W. 
A firm that uses both L and W in its infrastructure incurs an extra fixed cost HC 
because it needs to manage a heterogeneous infrastructure, incur higher staffing costs, 
and deal with potential incompatibilities. Deploying and managing a heterogeneous 
infrastructure is clearly more costly than managing a homogeneous infrastructure (only L 
or only W). 
                                                
6
 The assumption here is that IT adoption decisions are made in a centralized optimal way in each firm. It 
would be interesting to relax this assumption and examine the implications of other IT governance 
structures (see Weil and Ross 2004). 
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The value that firm  gets from its IT architecture by adopting W for )(t 
fraction of its applications that are close to W is HWL CuuU ,, , where 
WL uu ,, ,  is the value derived from L and W respectively: 
LL
t
L hCdttcu
1
,
1  and 
W
t
WW hdtpctVu
0
,
. 
]1,0[WV is the value for a W application, c  is the reduction of the application 
value (fit cost) depending on the distance t  of the application from the location of L or W 
respectively.  
Firm  benefits from network effects Lh , Wh  that depend on how many 
other firms adopt the same infrastructure (L or W) for the same range of applications. We 
assume linear network effect functions: 
dxxttehL 111 0  and dxxttehW
1
In the specification above, e is the intensity of the network effects.  It s well-
established in the literatures on network goods that when the network effect is strong, 
consumers could be locked in one of the competing technologies.  Nevertheless, this is 
not the only focus of the current model.  To incorporate more effects from other 
variables, we restrict the magnitude of the network effect and assume that 4/1e . 
Figure 1, depicts important aspects of the setup of our model. 
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Figure 1 Firm IT capabilities and IT architecture  
4.1 Open source adoption patterns 
A firm's IT adoption problem:  
The IT architecture value maximization condition gives  
t
c
pVece
t W
2
12 
Therefore, we have 
c
pVec
t W
2
0 , and 
c
pVce
t W
2
11 . 
There are six possible adoption patterns listed in table 1. 
Firm type ( ) 
Captures the IT capabilities of the firm 
IT 
architecture 
(range of 
applications 
used by a firm)
0 1
1 
L 
W 
'
Wh 
'
                          
'
Lh 
10..)(max ttsU
t
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Table 1 Adoption patterns conditions and W's profits  
The maximal price that W can set and have positive sales is ceVW . This is 
decreasing on the network effect parameter e. This happens because an increase of the W 
price p benefits its competitor L the more the stronger the network effect parameter e.  In 
addition, the maximal price that W can charge and still have the whole market is 
ecVW 1 , which is an increasing function of e.  The reason is the increasing value 
of the product with increasing adoption base.  
The following figure shows all the possible patterns of adoption. 
Pattern Constraint Condition Adoption pattern W s Profit function 
1 
00t  and 
01t   
ceVp W All firms adopt only L.   0
 
2 
100 t  and 
01t   
ceVp W
pceVW
pecVW 1
Firms with  
c e VW p
1 2e   adopt 
both W and L; firms with  
c e VW p
1 2e   adopt only L.  
p
0
c e VW p
1 2e t d
3  
100 t  and 
01t  
ceVp W
pceVW
ecVp W 1
All firms adopt both L and W  p 0
1
t d
4  
10t  and 
01t  
ceVp W
pecVW 1
Clients with  
c e VW p
2e 1
  only 
adopt W; clients with  
c e VW p
2e 1
c e VW p
1 2e
  adopt both 
W and L; clients with  
c e VW p
1 2e   
adopt only L.  
p c e VW p2e 1 c e VW p
2e 1
c e VW p
1 2e t d
5  
10t  and 
110 t  
ceVp W
pecVW 1
ecVp W 1
Firms with  
c e VW p
2e 1
  adopt 
only W; firms with  
c e VW p
2e 1
  
adopt both W and L.  
p c e VW p2e 1 c e VW p
2e 1
1
t d
6 
10t  and 
11t  
ecVp W 1 All firms adopt only W.   p
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Figure 2 Patterns of software adoption  
4.2 Profitability of proprietary firm  
We solve for the optimal pricing under each case listed in table 1, assuming 5.WV , and 
then compare the maximum profits for all cases to determine the profit-maximizing price 
and profit.   
The technical analysis appears in the Appendix. The final optimal price and profit 
at equilibrium are the following: 
(E1) If  e c 1/2  and 2e c 1 , then  2/cp   and  c/8 , 
c
ece
t
2
5.02/12
  (case 3). 
(E2) If  e c 1/2  and 2e c 1  , then  p c e 0. 5 /3   and  
1
c 1 2e
c e 0.5
3
3
, 
c
ece
t
2
3/5.0212
 (case 2). 
(E3) If  e c 1/2  and 2c e 1/2 , then  3/5.0ecp   and  
1
c 1 2e
c e 0.5
3
3 
c
ece
t
2
3/5.0212
 (case 2). 
Pattern 1 
          L 
Pattern 6 
          W 
Pattern 2 
           L  
 W
Pattern 3 
L 
           
    W 
Pattern 5 
      L 
           
        W 
Pattern 4 
       L 
W 
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The monopolist s profit is an increasing function of both the cost of product misfit 
parameter c and the network externality parameter e, which is consistent with the results 
from literatures on network externalities and product differentiation.  The equilibrium 
market condition depends on the magnitude of these two parameters.  When the sum of c 
and e is relatively small, the vendor has less market power.  The low type firms adopt 
both products and the high type firms adopt only L.  Increase in c and e makes it more 
and more costly for the high type firms to adopt L for applications that W fits better 
(located closer to W), hence gives the vendor more market power.  Accordingly, the line 
that divides the market between L and W is getting flatter with increasing c and e, as 
shown in figure 3.   When both c and e are relatively large, all firms adopt both W and L 
for some applications under equilibrium.  (We assume LC , HC  close to zero.)            
4.3 Social welfare 
We determine the socially optimal adoption pattern and compare it with the 
market equilibrium.   A social planner maximizes the total surplus, that is: 
1
0
0
1
)(
1max dChdtctVhCdttc HW
t
WLL
t
t 
Solving for the optimization problem, we have the social optimal adoption pattern 
is: 
ec
c
e
c
t S 2
2
1
2
141
2
1
L
W
0 1
Figure 3 Equilibrium adoption 
with increasing c and e
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The social planner has to consider a tradeoff between social surplus from product 
fit and that from network externality, which is related to the installed base of W or L in 
any one application.  The social surplus from network effect is maximized when the 
market division line is flat, so for each application all firms use W or all firms use L.   On 
the other hand, the social surplus from product fit is maximized when the division line is 
decreasing, so that high type firms use L for more applications than low type firms. To 
maximize the total social surplus, the social planner needs to balance these two effects. 
The result shows that the social optimal market share between W and L involves a 
division line that is flatter than the one in the market equilibrium.  When c is relatively 
large compared to e, in particular c>2e or c>4e-0.5 when 0.25-0.5e<c<1-2e, the 
difference in slope between the social optimal outcome and the market equilibrium is 
relatively small, which suggests a smaller surplus loss from network externality.  The 
social optimal outcome leads to a market division line that is strictly above the one from 
market equilibrium.  In other words, the social planner would like all firms to adopt more 
applications from W.  This implies that when the product fit cost is high, the proprietary 
firm W charges too much for the software.  Then, the social welfare loss is mostly from 
loss in product fit.   
As c decreases, the difference in slope between the two division lines increases, 
and the two division lines move toward each other. Hence, more and more social surplus 
loss comes from loss in network externality, and less and less comes from loss in product 
fit.  The two division lines will finally cross.     
Figure 4 below shows areas for inefficient adoption for each possible equilibrium 
condition (E1)-(E3). As one can observe, the equilibrium division line is always steeper 
than the socially optimal market division line. 
 18
        
Figure 4 Areas of inefficient adoption are between the red and green line   
In (E1), all firms inefficiently adopt L for more applications than it is socially 
optimal. The inefficiency is larger, the stronger the IT capabilities of the firm. In (E2), the 
pattern is similar, only now the high IT capability firms inefficiently adopt only open 
source.  
In (E3) the socially optimal division is much steeper than in (E1), (E2).  We 
observe both excessive adoption of proprietary architecture by the low type firms and 
excessive adoption of open source architecture by the medium to high type firms.     
4.4  Benchmark case: W monopoly  
When only W is available in the market, then W is a monopolist and the value 
that firms get from adopting W is etdtpctVU W
t
0 . Each firm maximizes 
the value of its IT architecture as follows: 
10..)(max ttsU
t 
Solving for the optimization problem, we have 
c
peV
t W .  
The constraints are pceV
c
peV
W
W 1  and 
Inefficiency in E3 
        
Inefficiency in E2 
        
Inefficiency in E1 
Red: 
socially 
optimal 
Green: 
equilibrium
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eVp
c
peV
W
W 0 . Thus if ceVp W  then all firms adopt W for all 
applications; if  eVpceV WW then all firms adopt W for 
c
peVW
 of their 
applications; if eVp W  then no one adopt W for any application. 
The monopolist's profit function is 
c
peV
ppt W
The monopolist's problem is: 
eVpceVts WWp ..max
First order condition gives 
2
eV
p W . Then 
c
eV
t W
2
 and 
0
4
1 2
eV
c
W . 
If   2/2 eVcceV WW
eVW
 , then  2/eVp W   and  
.2/,4/2 eVtceV WW    
If  2/2 eVcceV WW
eVW
 , then  ceVceVp WW ,   and  
.1t  
The monopolistic profit is an increasing function of the intensity of network 
externality, and a decreasing function of the product fit cost c.  When the fit cost c is 
high, the firms valuation for applications decreases rapidly with the distance of the 
application from the location of W.  Hence, it is too costly for the monopolist to lower the 
price so that firms adopt W for all applications. Therefore, the profit maximization price 
is set such that all firms only adopt W for the applications that are relatively close to 
the location of W (Figure 4).  This creates a loss of social welfare similar to the classical 
deadweight loss. Here the welfare loss is not from pricing out of the market of some 
firms, but because all firms are unable to use applications that do not have a good fit 
with the platform of the monopolist.   
On the other hand, when the misfit cost c is low, W sets a price so that all firms 
adopt W for all their applications.  A stronger e benefits the monopolist, since the firms 
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valuation for the product increases with the adoption base.          
As expected the W s profit under the monopoly case is higher than W s profit 
under competition from open source software. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Chief Information Officers and IT managers are actively considering the adoption of 
open source software within their IT architecture. In this paper, we developed analytical 
models to define the important dimensions of this decision and understand when and 
where firms adopt open source software.   
We find that there are a number of adoption patterns that depend on the strength 
of the network effect and the misfit cost for the applications. Most often firms have a 
heterogeneous software infrastructure using both proprietary and open source software. 
The higher the IT capabilities of a firm the more it adopts open source software. Low IT 
capability firms may adopt proprietary infrastructure for all their applications, and firms 
with strong IT capabilities may adopt only open source for all their applications. These 
results are consistent with evidence from the IT press. The equilibrium adoption is not 
socially optimal. The market does not internalize the network externalities, as much as a 
social planner does. The equilibrium adoption of open source or proprietary software 
might be socially excessive.  
Future research can collect data by surveying enterprise IT managers and 
empirically test hypotheses derived from the theoretical models developed here. Other 
research may also extend the model into other directions, such the dynamics of adoption, 
the strategic behavior of the open source community, and the impact of different IT 
governance structures on adoption decisions.  
Figure 5 Adoption of W (monopoly) 
Not adopt 
           
        W 
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Appendix 
Analysis of equilibrium Price and Profit (4.2) 
There are six cases. First we solve each case and then we compare the maximum profits 
to determine the equilibrium price and profits.  
Case 1 
When price is too high, all firms adopt L or stay out of the market. No one adopt W.  The 
monopolistic vendor s profit is equal to zero.  
Case 2 
0
2
11
1
2
00
..
max 21
0
c
pVce
t
c
pVec
t
ts
dtp
W
W
e
pVec
p
W
We solve the optimization problem by firstly using first order condition, and then check 
the inequality constraints.  F.O.C. gives 
WW
WW
VecpVecp
pVecpVec
3or  
03 
It's easy to see that p c e VW  is the minimum, and 3p c e VW   is the maximum.  
The constraints can be simplified as 
c e VW p
2c 0 p c e VW
c e VW p
2c 1 c e VW p
e 1 c VW p
2c 0 e 1 c VW p 
If  e c 1/2 , then the constraints are reduced to  e 1 c VW p c e VW  ; If  
e c 1/2
 , then the constraints are reduced to  c e VW p c e VW  .  Now check 
with p c e VW /3 : 
 23
2/12
3
121
3
0
3
ececV
Vec
ceVceVec
VecVecVec
W
W
W
W
WW
W 
Therefore, if e c 1/2  and 2e c 1 , then  p c e VW /3  and 
1
c 1 2e
c e 0.5
3
3
; 
if e c 1/2  and 2e c 1 , then  p e 0.5 c   and e 0.5 c 1 2e 14c ; 
if e c 1/2  and 2c e 1/2 , then p c e VW /3  and 
1
c 1 2e
c e 0.5
3
3
; 
if e c 1/2  and 2c e 1/2 , then p c e 0. 5  and 0.5 c e c
1
1 2e .  
Case 3 
0
2
11
1
2
00..
max
1
0
c
pVce
t
c
pVec
tts
dtp
W
W
p
We solve the optimization problem by using first order condition, and then check the 
inequality constraints. F.O.C. gives 
4
122
01422
4
1
'
W
Wp
Vc
p
pVc
c
Since 
2
1
e , the constraints are simplified as  
WW VcepecV 1 
If  c e e 1 c 12 e c , then this case is impossible.  If  e c 1/2 , then since 
VW c e 0.5 c e 0  , the constraint becomes 
0 p e c 0.5 
Now check if the constraints are satisfied: 
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cece
Vc
c
Vc
W
W
215.0
4
122
00
4
122 
Hence if 1 2e c , then  p c/2   and  c/8  ; otherwise  p e c 0.5   and  
e c 0.5 1 2e
4c  .  
Case 4  
p
max p c e VW p2e 1 c e VW p
2e 1
c e VW p
1 2e t d
s. t.
t 0 c e VW p2c 1
t 1 e 1 c VW p2c 0 
It's easy to verify that the constraints are only valid when e c 1/2 , and the constraints 
can be reduced to  0 p VW c e  . First order derivative of the profit function is: 
c
peVc
e
p
e
pVe WW
p 2121
'
When  p VW c e , the first order derivative is positive (= c1 2e  ). Given the properties 
of the quadratic function, we have p VW c e   and  
c VW c e
1 2e  .  
Case 5 
pcVeVcep
cpVce
c
pVce
t
ceVp
c
pVec
t
ts
dt
e
pVec
p
WW
W
W
W
W
e
pVec
W
p W
1 and 1
2101
2
1
10
1
2
0
..
12
max
1
12
The constraints are reduced to e 1 VW c p VW e c   if  e c 1/2  . Since  
VW e c 0 , this case is never optimal. 
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The constraints are reduced to e 1 VW c p e 1 c VW    e 0.5 c   if  
e c 1/2 .  Since   e 0.5 c 0 , this case is never optimal either.  
Case 6 
p
max p
s. t. t 0 c e VW p2c 1
t 1 e 1 c VW p2c 1 
The constraints can be simplified as: 
pcVe
c
pVce
pcVe
c
pVec
W
W
W
W
11
2
1
1
2 
Since  e 1/2 , we have the optimal pricing and profit under the current case is 
p e 1 VW c
e 1 VW c 
When  VW 0.5 , the optimal pricing  p e 0.5 c 0   and  e 0.5 c 0.   
Therefore this case cannot be optimal.  
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